Inconsistencies in knowledge bases are of major concern in knowledge representation and reasoning. In formalisms that employ model-based reasoning mechanisms inconsistencies render a knowledge base useless due to the non-existence of a model. In order to restore consistency an analysis and understanding of inconsistencies is mandatory. Recently, the field of inconsistency measurement has gained some attention for knowledge representation formalisms based on classical logic. An inconsistency measure is a tool that helps the knowledge engineer in obtaining insights into inconsistencies by assessing their severity. In this paper, we investigate inconsistency measurement in probabilistic conditional logic, a logic that incorporates uncertainty and focuses on the role of conditionals, i. e. if-then rules. We do so by extending inconsistency measures for classical logic to the probabilistic setting. Further, we propose novel inconsistency measures that are specifically tailored for the probabilistic case. These novel measures use distance measures to assess the distance of a knowledge base to a consistent one and therefore takes the crucial role of probabilities into account. We analyze the properties of the discussed measures and compare them using a series of rationality postulates.
Introduction
The field of knowledge representation and reasoning (Brachman and Levesque, 2004 ) is concerned with formal representations of knowledge and how these formalizations can be used for reasoning, i. e., how new information can be automatically inferred using a formal system. One of the big issues in knowledge representation is accuracy. Usually, the term "knowledge" is used to describe strict or objective information that is considered to be absolutely true in the given frame of reference, i. e. the real world. The counterpart, denoted by "subjective knowledge" or "beliefs", is used to describe information that is assumed to be true by the individual under consideration. While strict knowledge describes-by definition-a consistent state, subjective knowledge might be flawed in several aspects. Besides being incorrect with respect to the real world, subjective knowledge can be incomplete, uncertain, or inconsistent. That is, for some piece of information I it might be unknown whether I is true or false (incompleteness), I might be believed only to a certain degree (uncertainty), or I might be in conflict with another piece of information I (inconsistency). Note that inconsistency of two pieces of information I and I implies that at least one of them is incorrect. However, even without the possibility to compare I and I with the state of the real world, an inconsistency can be detected by a being capable of reasoning, which is not necessarily true for incorrect information in general. In this paper, we do not consider the general problem of incorrect information and always assume that represented pieces of information are subjective. However, as some terms like knowledge base have been established in the literature we adapt those conventions.
Within the field of knowledge representation and reasoning there are several subfields that deal with incomplete, uncertain, and/or inconsistent knowledge such as default (Reiter, 1980) and defeasible reasoning (Kyburg et al., 1990) , argumentation (Bench-Capon and Dunne, 2007; Rahwan and Simari, 2009) , or possibilistic and fuzzy reasoning (Siler and Buckley, 2005) . Among the most established logical frameworks for dealing with uncertainty is probability theory (Paris, 2006; Pearl, 1998) . There have been numerous works on combining probability theory with knowledge representation. For example, Bayesian networks and Markov nets allow for derivation of uncertain beliefs from other uncertain beliefs. Especially in application areas such as medical diagnosis, where the user has to rely crucially on the certainty of individual recommendations, reasoning using probabilistic models of knowledge serves well (Parmigiani, 2002) .
In this paper we employ probabilistic conditional logic (Rödder, 2000) for representing uncertain knowledge. In probabilistic conditional logic, knowledge is represented using probabilistic conditionals (ψ | φ) [p] with the intuitive meaning "if φ is true then ψ is true with probability p". Probabilistic conditional logic has been studied extensively under several aspects, e. g. effective reasoning mechanisms (Frisch and Haddawy, 1994) , default reasoning (Lukasiewicz, 2000) , or extensions with first-order logic fragments (Kern-Isberner and Lukasiewicz, 2004; Kern-Isberner and Thimm, 2010) . Moreover, the field of information theory provides a nice solution to the problem of incomplete information in probabilistic conditional logic. Using the principle of maximum entropy (Paris, 2006) one can complete uncertain and incomplete information in order to gain new information that was unspecified before, see also (Rödder, 2000; Kern-Isberner, 2001 ). The expert system SPIRIT (Rödder and Meyer, 1996 ) is a working system that employs reasoning based on the principle of maximum entropy. It has been applied to various fields of operations research such as project risk management (Ahuja and Rödder, 2002) and portfolio selection (Rödder et al., 2009 ). Though reasoning with maximum entropy can deal with incomplete and uncertain information, it is not suitable for reasoning with inconsistent information. But inconsistency is a ubiquitous matter and human beings have to deal with it all the time. In knowledge engineering and expert system design it becomes most apparent when multiple experts try to build up a common knowledge base. However, the issue of extending reasoning with maximum entropy to inconsistent knowledge bases has been dealt with in the literature only little so far, cf. (Rödder and Xu, 2001; Finthammer et al., 2007; Daniel, 2009) .
In this paper, we investigate inconsistencies in probabilistic conditional logic from an analytical perspective. One way to analyze inconsistencies is by measuring them. An inconsistency measure is a function that quantifies the severity of inconsistencies in knowledge bases. An inconsistency value of zero indicates no inconsistency (and therefore consistency) while the larger the inconsistency value, the more severe the inconsistency. Thus, an inconsistency measure can be seen as the counterpart to an information measure (Cover, 2001) for the case of inconsistent information. Recently, there has been a gain in attention to approaches for measuring inconsistency in classical logics, see e. g. (Hunter and Konieczny, 2010; Grant and Hunter, 2011) . In general, an inconsistency measure can be used to support the knowledge engineer in building a consistent knowledge base or repairing an inconsistent one. For example, Grant and Hunter (2011) develop an approach for stepwise inconsistency resolution of inconsistent knowledge bases that makes use of inconsistency measures. In their approach, a knowledge base is repaired by e. g. deleting or weakening formulas. There, inconsistency measures serve as heuristics for selecting the right formula that has to be modified, i. e. by selecting that one that maximizes consistency gain. Inconsistency measures can also be used to determine which pieces of information are most responsible for producing the inconsistency. In (Hunter and Konieczny, 2010; Thimm, 2011b ) the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953 ) is used to distribute the inconsistency value of a knowledge base among the individual formulas. In a setting where knowledge is merged from different sources this information can help in identifying the responsible contributors.
However, classical approaches for inconsistency measurement do not grasp the nuances of probabilistic knowledge and allow only for a very coarse assessment of the severity of inconsistencies. In particular, those approaches do not take the crucial role of probabilities into account and exhibit a discontinuous behavior in measuring inconsistency. That is, a slight modification of the probability of a conditional in a knowledge base may yield a discontinuous change in the value of the inconsistency. Consequently, we develop novel inconsistency measures that are more apt for the probabilistic setting. We do so by continuing and largely extending previous work (Thimm, 2009 (Thimm, , 2011a . In particular, the contributions of this paper are as follows. First, we propose and discuss a series of rationality postulates for inconsistency measures in probabilistic conditional logic. Many of those postulates are inspired by similar properties for the classical case-see e. g. (Hunter and Konieczny, 2010 )-and others specifically address demands arising from the use of a probabilistic logic, such as the demand for a continuous behavior with respect to changes in the knowledge base. Second, we extend several inconsistency measures that were proposed for the classical case to the more expressive framework of probabilistic conditional logic and investigate their properties with respect to the rationality postulates. Third, we pick up an extended logical formalization (Muiño, 2011) of the inconsistency measure proposed in (Thimm, 2009) for probabilistic conditional logic, generalize it, and define a family of inconsistency measures based on minimizing the distance of a knowledge base to a consistent one. We also propose a novel compound measure that solves an issue with the previous measure. We thoroughly investigate the properties of all measures with respect to the rationality postulates and discuss their advantages and disadvantages with the use of examples.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We continue in Section 2 with an overview on probabilistic conditional logic and introduce further notation. In Section 3 we approach the problem of inconsistency measurement in probabilistic conditional logic by developing a series of rationality postulates. We continue with an overview on the technical results of the paper in Section 4. We extend inconsistency measures for classical logic to the probabilistic setting in Section 5 and present novel inconsistency measures that are more apt for the probabilistic setting in Section 6. In Section 7 we review related work and in Section 8 we conclude with some final remarks. All proofs of technical results can be found in the appendix.
Probabilistic Conditional Logic
Let At be a propositional signature, i. e. a finite set of propositional atoms. Let L(At) be the corresponding propositional language generated by the atoms in At and the connectives ∧ (and ), ∨ (or ), and ¬ (negation). For φ, ψ ∈ L(At) we abbreviate φ∧ψ by φψ and ¬φ by φ. The symbols and ⊥ denote tautology and contradiction, respectively. We use possible worlds, i. e. syntactical representations of truth assignments, for interpreting formulas in L(At). A possible world ω is a complete conjunction, i. e. a conjunction that contains for each a ∈ At either a or ¬a. Let Ω(At) denote the set of all possible worlds. A possible world ω ∈ Ω(At) satisfies an atom a ∈ At, denoted by ω |= a if and only if a positively appears in ω. The entailment relation |= is extended to arbitrary formulas in L(At) in the usual way. Formulas ψ, φ ∈ L(At) are equivalent, denoted by φ ≡ ψ, if and only if ω |= φ whenever ω |= ψ for every ω ∈ Ω(At).
The central notion of probabilistic conditional logic (Rödder, 2000) is that of a probabilistic conditional.
is meant to describe a probabilistic if-then rule, i. e., the informal interpretation of c is that "if φ is true then ψ is true with probability p". If
we denote with head(c) = ψ the head of c, with body(c) = φ the body of c, and with prob(c) = p the probability of c. Let C(At) denote the set of all probabilistic conditionals with respect to At. Definition 2 (Knowledge base). A knowledge base K is a finite sequence of probabilistic conditionals, i. e. it holds that K = c 1 , . . . , c n for some c 1 , . . . , c n ∈ C(At).
We impose an ordering on the conditionals in a knowledge base K only for technical convenience. The order can be arbitrary and has no further meaning other than to enumerate the conditionals of a knowledge base in an unambiguous way. For similar reasons we allow a knowledge base to contain the same probabilistic conditional more than once. We come back to the reasons for these design choices later. However, for all practical purposes a knowledge base can be used as a set of probabilistic conditionals, as it is usually defined for knowledge representation issues. In particular, for knowledge bases K = c 1 , . . . , c n , K = c 1 , . . . , c m and a probabilistic conditional c we define c ∈ K via c ∈ {c 1 , . . . , c n }, K ⊆ K via {c 1 , . . . , c n } ⊆ {c 1 , . . . , c m }, and K = K via {c 1 , . . . , c n } = {c 1 , . . . , c m }. The union of knowledge bases is defined via concatenation.
Semantics are given to probabilistic conditionals by probability functions on Ω(At). Let F(At) denote the set of all probability functions P : Ω(At) → [0, 1]. A probability function P ∈ F(At) is extended to formulas φ ∈ L(At) via
That is, the probability of a formula is the sum of the probabilities of the possible worlds that satisfy that formula. If P ∈ F(At) then P satisfies a probabilistic conditional (ψ | φ) [p] , denoted by P |= pr (ψ | φ) [p] , if and only if P (ψφ) = pP (φ). Note that we do not define probabilistic satisfaction via P (ψ | φ) = P (ψφ) /P(φ) = p in order to avoid a case differentiation for P (φ) = 0, see (Paris, 2006) , if and only if P (ψ ∧ ) = pP ( ) which is equivalent to P (ψ) = p. A probability function P satisfies a knowledge base K (or is a model of K), denoted by P |= pr K, if and only if P |= pr c for every c ∈ K. Let Mod(K) be the set of models of K. If Mod(K) = ∅ then K is consistent and if Mod(K) = ∅ then K is inconsistent. Example 1. Consider the knowledge base
with the intuitive meaning that birds (b) usually (with probability 0.9) fly (f ), that penguins (p) are always birds, and that penguins usually do not fly (only with probability 0.01). The knowledge base K is consistent as for e. g. P ∈ F(At) with
it holds that P |= pr K as e. g.
P (b) = P (bf p) + P (bf p) + P (bf p) + P (bf p) = 0.55 and P (bf ) = P (bf p) + P (bf p) = 0.495
Example 2. The knowledge base {(a)[0.9], (a)[0.4]} is inconsistent as there is no P ∈ F(At) with P (a) = 0.9 and P (a) = 0.4. Furthermore, observe that
48 which can not simultaneously be satisfied with P (b) = 0.4.
is normal if and only if there are ω, ω ∈ Ω(At) with ω |= ψφ and ω |= ψφ. In other words, a probabilistic conditional c is normal if it is satisfiable but not tautological.
Example 3. The probabilistic conditionals c 1 = ( | a) [1] and c 2 = (a | a) [0.1] are not normal as c 1 is tautological (there is no ω ∈ Ω(At) with ω |= a as a ≡⊥) and c 2 is not satisfiable (there is no ω ∈ Ω(At) with ω |= aa as aa ≡⊥).
As a technical convenience, for the rest of this paper we consider only normal probabilistic conditionals, so let K be the set of all non-empty knowledge bases of C(At) that contain only normal probabilistic conditionals. 
This means that two knowledge bases K 1 and K 2 are semi-extensionally equivalent if we find a mapping between the conditionals of both knowledge bases such that each conditional of K 1 is extensionally equivalent to its image in K 2 . The following relationship is easy to see and given without proof.
However, note that the other direction is not true in general.
Example 4. Consider the two knowledge bases One way for reasoning with knowledge bases is by using model-based inductive reasoning techniques (Paris, 2006) . For example, reasoning based on the principle of maximum entropy selects among the models of a knowledge base K the one unique probability function with maximum entropy. Reasoning with this model satisfies several commonsense properties, see e. g. (Paris, 2006; Kern-Isberner, 2001 ). However, a necessary requirement for the application of model-based inductive reasoning techniques is the existence of at least one model of a knowledge base. In order to reason with inconsistent knowledge bases the inconsistency has to be resolved first. In the following, we discuss the topic of inconsistency measurement for probabilistic conditional logic as inconsistency measures can support the knowledge engineer in the task of resolving inconsistency.
Principles for Inconsistency Measurement
Inconsistency measurement is a research topic that has been mainly investigated in the field of classical theories only, see e. g. (Grant and Hunter, 2011) for some recent work. In the following, we investigate inconsistency measurement for probabilistic conditional logic in a principled fashion but borrow some notation from classical inconsistency measurement like from (Hunter and Konieczny, 2010 ). An inconsistency measure I is a function that maps a (possibly inconsistent) knowledge base onto a non-negative real value, i. e., an inconsistency measure I is a function I : K → [0, ∞). The value I(K) for a knowledge base K is called the inconsistency value of K with respect to I. In order to formalize the intuition behind inconsistency measures we give a list of principles that should be satisfied by any reasonable inconsistency measure. For that we need some further notation.
Definition 3 (Minimal inconsistent set). A set M of probabilistic conditionals is minimal inconsistent if M is inconsistent and every M M is consistent.
Let MI(K) be the set of the minimal inconsistent subsets of K ∈ K.
. Then the set of minimal inconsistent subsets of K is given via
The notion of minimal inconsistent subsets captures those conditionals that are responsible for causing inconsistencies. Conditionals that do not take part in creating an inconsistency are free.
Definition 4 (Free conditional). A probabilistic conditional c ∈ K is free in K if and only if c / ∈ M for all M ∈ MI(K).
For a conditional or a knowledge base C let At(C) denote the set of atoms appearing in C.
Note that the notion of safeness is due to Hunter and Konieczny (Hunter and Konieczny, 2010) . The notion of a free conditional is clearly more general then the notion of a safe conditional.
Proposition 2.
If c is safe in K then c is free in K.
Consider now the following properties, cf. (Hunter and Konieczny, 2010; Thimm, 2009 ). Let K, K be knowledge bases and c a probabilistic conditional.
Consistency K is consistent if and only if
The property consistency demands that I(K) is minimal for consistent K. The properties monotonicity and super-additivity demand that I is non-decreasing under the addition of new information. The properties weak independence and independence say that the inconsistency value should stay the same when adding "harmless" information. The property penalty is the counterpart of independence and demands that adding inconsistent information increases the inconsistency value. We define the property irrelevance of syntax in terms of the equivalence relation ≡ s as all inconsistent knowledge bases are equivalent with respect to ≡ e . For an inconsistency measure I, imposing irrelevance of syntax to hold in terms of ≡ e would yield I(K) = I(K ) for every two inconsistent knowledge bases K, K . The property MI-separabilitywhich has been adapted from (Hunter and Konieczny, 2010) -states that determining the value of I(K 1 ∪ K 2 ) can be split into determining the values of I(K 1 ) and I(K 2 ) if the minimal inconsistent subsets of K 1 ∪ K 2 are partitioned by K 1 and K 2 .
The above properties do not take the crucial role of probabilities into account. In order to account for those we need some further notation. Let K be a knowledge base. For
|K| we denote by K[ x] the knowledge base that is obtained from K by replacing the probabilities of the conditionals in K by the values in x, respectively. More precisely,
Definition 6 (Characteristic function). Let K ∈ K be a knowledge base. The function Λ K :
The above definition is the justification for imposing an order on the probabilistic conditionals of a knowledge base.
Definition 7 (Characteristic inconsistency function). Let I be an inconsistency measure and let K ∈ K be a knowledge base. The function
with θ I,K = I • Λ K is called the characteristic inconsistency function of I and K.
The following property continuity describes our main demand for continuous inconsistency measurement, i. e., a "slight" change in the knowledge base should not result in a "vast" change of the inconsistency value.
Continuity θ I,K is continuous
The above property demands a certain smoothness of the behavior of I. Given a fixed set of probabilistic conditionals this property demands that changes in the quantitative part of the conditionals trigger a continuous change in the inconsistency value. Note that we require the qualitative part of the conditionals, i. e. premises and conclusions of the conditionals, to be fixed. This makes this property not applicable for the classical setting. In the probabilistic setting satisfaction of this property is helpful for the knowledge engineer in restoring consistency. Observe that for every knowledge base K ∈ K there is always a x ∈ [0, 1] |K| such that K[ x] is consistent, cf. (Thimm, 2009) . While in the classical setting, consistency of knowledge bases can only be restored by either removing or weakening formulas, in the probabilistic setting every knowledge base can also be made consistent by changing probabilities, see (Finthammer et al., 2007) for an heuristic approach utilizing this observation. Given that we have a continuous inconsistency measure the search for a "close" consistent solution can be better guided, see (Thimm, 2011b) for approaches that utilize continuous inconsistency measures in order to implement a search procedure similar to gradient descent search in optimization (Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004) .
Some relationships between the above properties are as follows.
Proposition 3. Let I be an inconsistency measure and let K, K be some knowledge bases.
1.
If I satisfies super-additivity then I satisfies monotonicity. 2. If I satisfies independence then I satisfies weak independence. 3. If I satisfies MI-separability then I satisfies independence.
In (Hunter and Konieczny, 2010) two further properties are discussed for classical inconsistency measurement: normalization and dominance. The property normalization can be phrased as follows (note that the term normalization is not the be confused with our notion of normal conditionals).
The above property states that inconsistency values should be bounded from above by one. On the one hand, this demand makes perfect sense as this allows for comparing inconsistency values of different knowledge bases in a unified way. On the other hand, this demand is-in general-in conflict with the demand for super-additivity as the following example shows.
on a propositional signature At i = {a 1 , . . . , a i }. Obviously, the knowledge base c 2 ) = x. It follows that, if I satisfies super-additivity and does not take the size of signature of a knowledge base into account then there is a natural number n ∈ N such that for
Thus, I cannot satisfy normalization.
The previous example showed that an inconsistency measure that does not take (the size of) the signature into account cannot satisfy consistency, super-additivity, and normalization at the same time. Furthermore, taking (the size of) the signature into account may become unintuitive. As for the case of Example 6, in order to allow I to satisfy consistency, superadditivity, and normalization it has to hold that for K = c defined on At 2 it follows that I(K) = I(K ). As K = K this result may be unintuitive. However, one has to note that for K the whole language is affected by the inconsistency while for K only "half" of the language is affected. In particular, for the proposition a 2 ∈ At 2 there is no conditional c ∈ K such that c ∈ M for some M ∈ MI(K ) and a 2 ∈ At(c). Provided that we employ a paraconsistent reasoning mechanism for probabilistic knowledge-like the one proposed in (Daniel, 2009 )-information about a 2 can consistently be derived, maybe only by inferring that there is no information on a 2 , i. e., by deriving the probability 0.5 for a 2 . This observation distinguishes K from K as for the latter a 2 does not belong to the signature and therefore no information is derivable for a 2 at all. Although this distinction is marginal, observe that there is a difference in inferring that we have no information on a 2 and that inference on a 2 is not defined.
We now turn to the property dominance (Hunter and Konieczny, 2010) which can be phrased as follows. Let c 1 |= pr c 2 be defined via Mod({c 1 }) ⊆ Mod({c 2 }) for conditionals c 1 , c 2 .
The motivation of the property dominance in the classical setting is that logically stronger formulas have the potential to bring more conflicts (Hunter and Konieczny, 2010) . In the context of probabilistic conditional logic this property is vacuous as entailment by probabilistic conditionals is trivial.
Applying this observation to the property dominance we obtain
which is a weakening of the property irrelevance of syntax. For this reason, we will not consider the property dominance in what follows.
Overview of Results
In the following sections we investigate different inconsistency measures with respect to the properties defined above. We review inconsistency measures for classical logics and adapt them to the probabilistic case in Section 5. In particular, we investigate the drastic inconsistency measure I 0 , the MI inconsistency measure I MI , the MI C inconsistency measure I C MI , and the η-inconsistency measure I η . Afterwards, we develop novel inconsistency measures for the probabilistic case in Section 6. More specifically, we develop the family of d-inconsistency measures I D that are based on distance measures D and the family of Σ-inconsistency measures I I Σ that utilize other inconsistency measures. Finally, in Section 7 we also investigate another inconsistency measure I h µ from related work (Daniel, 2009) . Table 1 summarizes the properties of the inconsistency measures discussed in this paper. Note that we only show the properties of the p-norm distance inconsistency measure I p as a particularly good representative for d-inconsistency measures I D . The properties of other For the same reasons we only show the properties of the Σ-inconsistency measure instantiated with the p-norm distance inconsistency measure. In Table 1 the entry "X" means that the inconsistency measure satisfies the given property, the entry p = 1 means that the property is satisfied if the condition is satisfied, an entry in parentheses means that satisfaction of the property is conjectured, and a question mark means that it is unclear whether the property is satisfied.
In the following, we continue with providing the formal definitions of the inconsistency measures and the elaboration of the technical results.
Classical Inconsistency Measures
We start with a survey on existing approaches to inconsistency measurement for classical logic and adapt those to the probabilistic case. In particular, we have a look at the drastic inconsistency measure, the MI inconsistency measure, the MI C inconsistency measure, and the η-inconsistency measure, see e. g. (Hunter and Konieczny, 2008; Knight, 2001) for the classical definitions. What these approaches have in common, due to their origin, is that they concentrate on the qualitative part of inconsistency rather than the quantitative part, i. e. the probabilities.
Drastic Inconsistency Measure
The simplest approach to define an inconsistency measure is by just differentiating whether a knowledge base is consistent or inconsistent.
Definition 8 (Drastic inconsistency measure). Let I 0 : K → [0, ∞) be the function defined as
The function I 0 is called the drastic inconsistency measure.
The drastic inconsistency measure allows only for a binary decision on inconsistencies and does not quantify the severity of inconsistencies. Although being a very simple inconsistency measure, I 0 still satisfies several basic properties as the next proposition shows.
Proposition 5. The function I 0 satisfies consistency, irrelevance of syntax, monotonicity, weak independence, independence, and normalization.
Notice, that I 0 satisfies neither super-additivity, penalty, MI-separability, nor continuity.
Example 7. Consider the knowledge bases K 1 = c 1 , c 2 and K 2 = c 3 , c 4 given via
It follows that I 0 (K 1 ) = I 0 (K 2 ) = 1 but
therefore violating both super-additivity and MI-separability. Furthermore, c 4 is not a free conditional in
violating penalty. Also, I 0 fails to satisfy continuity as Im I 0 = {0, 1} (Im f denotes the image of the function f ).
One thing to note is that I 0 is the upper bound for any inconsistency measure that satisfies consistency and normalization, i. e., if I satisfies consistency and normalization then I(K) ≤ I 0 (K) for every K ∈ K (Thimm, 2011b).
MI Inconsistency Measure
The next inconsistency measure quantifies inconsistency by the number of minimal inconsistent subsets of a knowledge base.
Definition 9 (MI inconsistency measure). Let I MI : K → [0, ∞) be the function defined as
The definition of the MI inconsistency measure is motivated by the intuition that the more minimal inconsistent subsets the greater the inconsistency.
Proposition 6. The function I MI satisfies consistency, monotonicity, super-additivity, weak independence, independence, irrelevance of syntax, MI-separability, and penalty.
Notice, that I MI satisfies neither normalization nor continuity.
Example 8. Consider again K 1 and K 2 from Example 7. It holds that I MI (K 1 ∪ K 2 ) = 2 violating normalization. Also, I MI fails to satisfy continuity as Im I MI ⊆ N 0 (the non-negative natural numbers).
For a further discussion of the MI inconsistency measure we refer to (Thimm, 2011b).
MI
C Inconsistency Measure Only considering the number of minimal inconsistent subsets may be too simple for assessing inconsistencies in general. Another indicator for the severity of inconsistencies is the size of minimal inconsistent subsets. A large minimal inconsistent subset means that the inconsistency is distributed over a large number of conditionals. The more conditionals involved in an inconsistency the less severe the inconsistency is. Furthermore, a small minimal inconsistent subset means that the participating conditionals strongly represent contradictory information. Consider the following example for classical logic that can be found in e. g. (Hunter and Konieczny, 2008) .
Example 9. In a lottery there are n lottery tickets and only one of them is the winning ticket. If w i denotes the proposition that ticket i will win the lottery then the (classical) formula φ = w 1 ∨ . . . ∨ w n can be regarded as true. Furthermore, the belief of each ticket buyer i is that he will not win the lottery, i. e., the formula φ i = ¬w i is regarded to be true for each i = 1, . . . , n. Obviously the set {φ, φ 1 , . . . , φ n } is inconsistent as φ demands that one ticket has to win and, hence, one ticket owner k is wrong in assuming ¬w k . However, with increasing number of available tickets the inconsistency becomes negligible and each ticket owner is justified in believing that he will not win.
Although the previous example has been formulated for classical logic the argument stands for probabilistic logics as well.
The following inconsistency measure is inspired by (Hunter and Konieczny, 2008) and aims at differentiating between minimal inconsistent sets of different size.
C inconsistency measure sums over the reciprocal of the sizes of all minimal inconsistent subsets. In that way, a large minimal inconsistent subset contributes less to the inconsistency value than a small minimal inconsistent subset. As the MI inconsistency measure the MI C inconsistency measure behaves well with respect to many desirable properties.
Proposition 7. The function I C MI satisfies consistency, monotonicity, super-additivity, weak independence, independence, irrelevance of syntax, MI-separability, and penalty.
Note that I C MI satisfies neither normalization nor continuity. Example 10. Consider the knowledge base K = c 1 , . . . , c 6 given via
It follows that I For a further discussion of the MI C inconsistency measure we refer to (Thimm, 2011b).
η-Inconsistency measure
The work (Knight, 2001 ) employs probability theory itself to measure inconsistency in classical theories by considering probability functions on classical interpretations. Those ideas can be extended for measuring inconsistency in probabilistic logics by considering probability functions on probability functions. LetP : F(At) → [0, 1] be a probability function on F(At) such thatP (P ) > 0 only for finitely many P ∈ F(At). Let F 2 (At) be the set of those probability functions. Then defineP
for a conditional c. This means that the probability (in terms ofP ) of a conditional is the sum of the probabilities of probability functions that satisfy c. Note that this definition is similar in spirit to the definition of the probability of formulas in (1) . The main difference is that in (1) formulas of the object level are propositional formulas and in (2) formulas of the object level are probabilistic conditionals. Note also that by restrictingP to assign a non-zero value only to finitely many P ∈ F(At), the sum in (2) is well-defined. Now consider the following definition of the η-inconsistency measure.
Definition 11 (η-inconsistency measure). Let I η : K → [0, ∞) be the function defined as
The function I η is called the η-inconsistency measure.
The idea of the η-inconsistency measure is that it looks for the largest probability that can be consistently assigned to the conditionals of a knowledge base and defines the inconsistency value inversely proportional to this probability.
Example 11. Let K be a knowledge base with
pr A 2 and P 3 |= pr A 3 . Then defineP ∈ F 2 (At) viâ
and similarlyP ((a) 
It is also easy to see that there is noP ∈ F 2 (At) such thatP (c) > 2 /3 for all c ∈ K. Therefore, it follows I η (K) = 1 − 2 /3 = 1 /3.
Several properties for the η-inconsistency measure can be directly derived from properties of its classical counterpart. For example, the following proposition is a direct extension of Theorem 2.12 in (Knight, 2002) .
As for the properties proposed in the previous section consider the following proposition.
Proposition 9. The function I η satisfies consistency, monotonicity, weak independence, independence, irrelevance of syntax and normalization.
Note that I η does not satisfy super-additivity, penalty, MI-separability and continuity.
Example 12. Consider again the knowledge bases K 1 = c 1 , c 2 and K 2 = c 3 , c 4 from Example 7 given via
By Proposition 8 it follows that
as well, therefore violating both super-additivity and MI-separability (observe that there are P 1 , P 2 such that P 1 |= pr c 1 , c 3 and P 2 |= c 2 , c 4 ). Consider now the knowledge base
is not a free conditional in K 3 . However, it holds that
as there are P 1 , P 2 ∈ F(At) with . It holds that I η (K x ) = 1 /2 for x = 0.2 and I η (K x ) = 0 for x = 0.2. Therefore, I η fails to satisfy continuity.
Classical Inconsistency Measures and Continuity
The inconsistency measures discussed above were initially developed for inconsistency measurement in classical theories and therefore allow only for a "discrete" measurement. Hence, all of the above discussed inconsistency measures do not satisfy continuity. But satisfaction of continuity is crucial for an inconsistency measure in probabilistic logics in order to assess inconsistencies in a meaningful manner, cf. also Section 3.
Example 13. Consider the knowledge base K = c 1 , c 2 , c 3 given via
The knowledge base K is inconsistent and the set of minimal inconsistent subsets is given by MI(K) = {{c 1 , c 2 , c 3 }}. It follows that
Consider a modification K = c 1 , c 2 , c 3 of K given via
The knowledge base K is still inconsistent and it holds that I(K ) = I(K) for I ∈ {I 0 , I MI , I
C MI , I η }. Now consider the knowledge base K = c 1 , c 2 , c 3 given via
The knowledge base K is consistent and it follows that I 0 (K ) = I MI (K ) = I C MI (K ) = I η (K ) = 0. By comparing K and K one can discover only a minor difference of the modeled knowledge. Whereas in K the proposition b is assigned a probability of 1 in K it is assigned a probability of 0.999. From a practical point of view this difference may be of no relevance. Still, a knowledge engineer may not grasp the harmlessness of the inconsistency in K as K has the same degree of inconsistency with respect to those classical measures.
The above example motivates the need for a more graded approach to measure the inconsistencies in K, K , and K . This measure should assign K a much smaller inconsistency value than to K in order to distinguish their severities. In the next section, we continue with an investigation of inconsistency measures that take the probabilities of conditionals into account and therefore satisfy those needs.
Inconsistency Measures based on Distance Minimization
As can be seen in Example 13 the probabilities of conditionals play a crucial role in creating inconsistencies. In order to respect this role we propose a family of inconsistency measures that is based on the distance to consistency. To this end we employ the notion of a distance measure.
The d-inconsistency measure
The obvious difference between classical knowledge bases-i. e. sets of classical formulasand probabilistic knowledge bases is that the latter are parametrized by probabilities. Therefore, given a knowledge base of a fixed qualitative structure the different instantiations of probabilities can be represented within the vector space [0, 1] |K| . In a vector space, the traditional means of measuring differences are distance measures.
is called a distance measure if it satisfies the following properties:
The simplest form of a distance measure is the drastic distance measure d 0 n defined as d 0 n ( x, y) = 0 for x = y and d 0 n ( x, y) = 1 for x = y (for x, y ∈ R n and n ∈ N + ). A more interesting distance measure is the p-norm distance.
. . , x n , y = y 1 , . . . , y n ∈ R n is called the p-norm distance.
Special cases of the p-norm distance include the Manhattan distance (for p = 1) and the Euclidean distance (for p = 2).
In order to deal with vector spaces of different dimensions we also consider distance generators which map a dimension n ∈ N + to a corresponding distance function.
for every n ∈ N + and x 1 , . . . , x n+1 , y 1 , . . . , y n+1 ∈ R. 2. D is super-additively generating if D(n)( x 1 , . . . , x n , y 1 , . . . , y n ) +D(m)( x n+1 , . . . , x n+m , y n+1 , . . . , y n+m ) ≤D(n + m)( x 1 , . . . , x n+m , y 1 , . . . , y n+m )
for every n, m ∈ N + and x 1 , . . . , x n+m , y 1 , . . . , y n+m ∈ R.
for every i = 1, . . . , n and n ∈ N + . 4. D is continuously generating if D(n) is continuous for every n ∈ N + .
Although distance generators may be defined quite arbitrarily we consider the drastic dis-
n (for every n, p ∈ N + ). Coming back to the issue of measuring inconsistency one can define the "severity of inconsistency" in a knowledge base by the minimal distance of the knowledge base to a consistent one. As we are able to identify knowledge bases of the same qualitative structure in a vector space, we can employ distance measures for measuring inconsistency. (6) for K ∈ K is called the d-inconsistency measure.
Definition 15 (d-inconsistency measure). Let D be a distance generator. Then the function
The idea behind the d-inconsistency measure is that we look for a consistent knowledge base that both 1.) has the same qualitative structure as the input knowledge base and 2.) is as close as possible to the the input knowledge base. That is, if the input knowledge base is K[ x] we look at all y ∈ [0, 1] |K| such that K[ y] is consistent and x and y are as close as possible with respect to the distance measure D(|K|).
As we are mainly working with the p-norm distance we abbreviate I D p simply by I p . As the following theorem shows the d-inconsistency measure can be phrased using the minimum instead of the infimum for every reasonable distance measure.
Theorem 1. If D is continuously generating then
for every K ∈ K.
As the p-norm distance is a continuous function it also follows that I p can be written like (A.2) for every p ∈ N. In (Thimm, 2009 (Thimm, , 2011b ) the measure I 1 has been investigated in a preliminary fashion while (Muiño, 2011; Thimm, 2011a) contain some first discussions of the general p-norm distance inconsistency measure. In particular, in (Muiño, 2011) it has been shown that for every p, p ∈ N + with p = p the two measures I p and I p are not equivalent, i. e., there are knowledge bases K 1 and K 2 such that
Consider also the following observation.
Proposition 10. It holds I D 0 = I 0 .
Before we investigate the formal properties of the above measure we first have a look at an example.
Example 14. We continue Example 13 with the knowledge base K = c 1 , c 2 , c 3 given via
and consider the p-norm distance inconsistency measure. In particular, observe that for
is consistent} for all p ∈ N + . That is, K * is a consistent knowledge base that has minimal p-norm distance to K for all p ∈ N + . In particular, it holds that I p (K) = p √ 2 · 0.5 p . For example, it holds that
Furthermore, it holds that I 1 (K ) = 0.001 and I 2 (K ) ≈ 0.00071, and clearly I 1 (K ) = I 2 (K ) = 0.
As with respect to the properties proposed in the previous section consider the following results.
Theorem 2. Let D be a distance generator such that I D is well-defined. As for the specific case of the p-norm distance inconsistency measure consider the following theorem. 
For p = 1 it follows that
therefore satisfying MI-separability. However, for p = 2 it follows that
violating MI-separability-and also super-additivity-as As the above example suggests MI-separability seems to be satisfied for I p with p = 1. However, neither a counterexample nor a formal proof has been found yet. [1] . It is easy to see that I 1 (K) = 2 violating normalization.
However, a normalized variant of I p can be defined by exploiting I p (K) ≤ |K| for all K ∈ K, cf. (Thimm, 2011b).
The Σ-inconsistency measure
The main drawback of the inconsistency measure discussed above is that it does not satisfy penalty. However, this issue can be solved by the following compound measure. 
I(M) .
The Σ-inconsistency measure is defined as the sum of the inconsistency values of all minimal inconsistent subsets of the knowledge base under consideration. The following property is easy to see and given without proof. Therefore, the addition of the non-free conditional (a)[0.5] to K has been penalized by I
As hinted above, the Σ-inconsistency measure I I Σ (K) behaves well with respect to the property penalty, provided that the inner measure is a reasonable inconsistency measure. Consider the following theorem. As one can see, the Σ-inconsistency measure performs well with respect to all properties except normalization.
Related Work
The problem of measuring inconsistency in probabilistic knowledge bases is relatively novel and has-to our knowledge-only been addressed before in (Rödder and Xu, 2001) , (Daniel, 2009) and (Muiño, 2011) . We have a more closer look on the works (Muiño, 2011) and (Daniel, 2009) 
Further related work is concerned with measuring inconsistency in classical theories, see e. g. the works by Hunter et al. (Hunter and Konieczny, 2008; Grant and Hunter, 2008; Hunter and Konieczny, 2010) . While Konieczny, 2008, 2010) deal with measuring inconsistency in propositional logic, the work (Grant and Hunter, 2008) considers first-order logic. Those works also take a principled approach to measuring inconsistency and many of our properties have been adapted from e. g. (Hunter and Konieczny, 2008) . Furthermore, the inconsistency measures presented in Section 6 are straightforward translations of inconsistency measures from those works. However, Hunter et al. are working with classical theories and as such do not have to deal with probabilities as a means for knowledge representation. In order to adhere for the presence of probabilities we introduced continuous inconsistency measures which have no correspondent in the classical setting.
Besides the inconsistency measures discussed here another form of measuring inconsistency can be realized using culpability measures (Daniel, 2009; Thimm, 2009) , also used under the term inconsistency values in (Hunter and Konieczny, 2010) . A culpability measure does not assign a degree of inconsistency to the whole knowledge base but to each individual element of the knowledge base. The interpretation of culpability measures is that they assign a degree of "blame" for creating an inconsistency to an element. In (Hunter and Konieczny, 2010 ) such a measure has been defined in terms of some ordinary inconsistency measure and the Shapley value, a well-known solution for solving coalition games in game theory (Shapley, 1953) . This approach can also be applied for inconsistency measures for probabilistic logics as has been done for the measure I 1 in (Thimm, 2009). Furthermore, in (Daniel, 2009 ) the measure I h µ (see below) has also been extended to a culpability measure.
We go on by taking a closer look on the works by Muiño (Muiño, 2011) and Daniel (Daniel, 2009) , for some analysis on (Rödder and Xu, 2001 ) see (Thimm, 2011b) .
Infinitesimal Inconsistency Values
The research presented in this paper is complementary to the work in (Muiño, 2011) . The paper (Muiño, 2011 ) also discusses the I p measure but focuses on 1.) the problem of infinitesimal inconsistency values and 2.) the application of I p on the medical knowledge base CADIAG-2. In particular, it is not investigated how I p behaves with respect to the principles above.
The problem of infinitesimal inconsistency values appears when one defines probabilistic satisfaction via P |= pr alt (ψ | φ) [p] if and only if
A knowledge base K is |= pr alt -consistent if there exists P ∈ F(At) with P |= pr alt K. Using our notation, the inconsistency measure I p from (Muiño, 2011) can be defined via . However, one can easily construct a sequence of probability functions P 1 , P 2 , . . . such that P i (a) > 0 and P i (b | a) = 0.7 for i ∈ N and lim n→∞ P (a) = 0 .
In (Muiño, 2011) knowledge bases like K above are assigned an infinitesimal inconsistency value. The motivation for introducing infinitesimal inconsistency values stems from the application of I p on the medical knowledge base, a collection of expert rules relating symptoms and diseases. In (Muiño, 2011) it is shown that CADIAG-2 has an infinitesimal inconsistency value.
Candidacy Degrees of Best Candidates
Among others, one contribution of (Daniel, 2009 ) is an inconsistency measure on knowledge bases of probabilistic constraints. In particular, the work (Daniel, 2009 ) focuses on linear probabilistic knowledge bases but also considers generalizations such as polynomial probabilistic knowledge bases. However, in order to compare it to our work we simplify several notations and present the inconsistency measure I h µ of (Daniel, 2009 ) only for probabilistic conditional logic.
The central notion of (Daniel, 2009 ) is the candidacy function. A candidacy function is similar to a fuzzy set as it assigns a degree of membership of a probability function belonging to the models of a knowledge base. More specifically, a candidacy function C is a function C : F(At) → [0, 1]. A uniquely determined candidacy function C K can be assigned to a (consistent or inconsistent) knowledge base K as follows. For a probability function P ∈ F(At) and a set of probability functions S ⊆ F(At) let d E (P, S) denote the distance of P to S with respect to the Euclidean norm, i. e., d E (P, S) is defined via
Let h : R + → (0, 1] be a strictly decreasing, positive, and continuous log-concave function with h(0) = 1. Then the candidacy function C h K for a knowledge base K is defined as
for every P ∈ F(At). Note that the definition of the candidacy function C h K depends on the size of the signature At. The intuition behind this definition is that a probability function P that is near to the models of each probabilistic conditional in K gets a high candidacy degree in C h K (P ). It is easy to see that it holds that C h K (P ) = 1 if and only if P |= pr K. Using the candidacy function C h K the inconsistency measure I h µ can be defined via
for a knowledge base K. In (Daniel, 2009) it is shown that I h µ satisfies (among others) the following properties.
Proposition 12 (Daniel (2009) ). I h µ satisfies consistency, monotonicity, continuity, and normalization.
Furthermore, it can also be shown that the function I h µ satisfies the following properties. Theorem 5. I h µ satisfies irrelevance of syntax and weak independence. In Example 6 we talked about the issue of an inconsistency measure satisfying all three of consistency, super-additivity, and normalization. We showed that an inconsistency measure that does not take the cardinality of the signature into account cannot satisfy all these properties at once. As one can see above, the function I h µ takes the cardinality of the signature into account and it may be possible that I h µ satisfies super-additivity. However, this is not the case as the following example shows.
Example 20. Let At = {a 1 , a 2 } be a propositional signature and let K 1 = c 1 , c 2 and K 2 = c 3 , c 4 be knowledge bases with
and let K = K 1 ∪ K 2 . Note that both K 1 and K 2 are inconsistent and K 1 ∩ K 2 = ∅. As I h µ is defined on the semantic level and does not take the names of propositions into account it follows that I h µ (K 1 ) = I h µ (K 2 ). As the situations in K 1 and K 2 are symmetric and K i is symmetric with respect to c 1 and c 2 and with respect to c 3 and c 4 there are probability functions 
The above example is also a counterexample for MI-separability as K 1 and K 2 partition the set of minimal inconsistent subsets. Furthermore, it can be easily seen that I h µ also fails to satisfy penalty for similar reasons as I d fails to satisfy penalty. For the knowledge base
In other words, P is a probability function that has the maximal candidacy degree with respect to K. As K is inconsistent, it follows that P fails to satisfy at least one of the probabilistic conditionals of K. Assume that it holds that P |= pr (b | a) [1] which implies P (a) > 0. Consider the knowledge base
it follows that P also satisfies
Therefore, P has also maximal candidacy degree with respect to K which is clear as we only added information consistent with P (otherwise P would have violated (9)). It follows I h µ (K ) ≤ I h µ (K) and as {(b | a) [1] , (a) [1] , c } is a minimal inconsistent subset of K this contradicts penalty. Similar observations can be made when P |= pr (a) [1] or P |= pr (b) [0] . In (Daniel, 2009) it is shown that I h µ satisfies several other properties that cannot be related directly to our properties of Section 3, see (Thimm, 2011b) for a discussion. It is also still an open issue whether I h µ satisfies independence.
Summary and Discussion
Analyzing inconsistencies is of major concern in the area of knowledge representation as consistency is a necessary prerequisite for many knowledge representation formalisms. In particular, the task of inference bases mostly on the consistency of the underlying information. In this paper, we investigated inconsistency measures for probabilistic conditional logic. For that, we developed a series of rationality postulates for inconsistency measures motivated by both inconsistency measurement for classical logics and the peculiarities of probabilistic knowledge representation. We adapted several classical inconsistency measures and showed that they lack a particularly important property for the probabilistic domain, namely, a continuous behavior with respect to modifications of the knowledge base. Consequently, we investigated inconsistency measures based on distance measures and showed that these measures are more apt for the probabilistic domain. We compared these measures with related work, in particular with the approach of (Daniel, 2009) .
In this paper, we used probabilistic conditional logic for knowledge representation which suffices for many application areas that need to represent rule-like information. However, probabilistic conditional logic is not capable of expressing general linear relationships such as "a is twice as probable as b" or polynomial relationships such as "a and b are probabilistically independent". Furthermore, using point probabilities can be seen as too restricting as well and one may want to represent conditionals of the form (ψ | φ) [u, l] with the intended meaning that P (ψ | φ) ∈ [u, l], cf. (Lukasiewicz, 2002) . The motivation of using the simple framework of probabilistic conditional logic here merely stems from reasons of presentation rather than inadequacy of the ideas to more complex frameworks. In (Thimm, 2011b) the inconsistency measure I 1 has also been defined for the more general frameworks of linear probabilistic knowledge bases and probabilistic conditional logic with intervals. For example, by defining K[ x] for a knowledge base of the form
2n , the inconsistency measure I D can be defined in the same way as in Definition 15 for probabilistic conditionals with intervals. Furthermore, the general properties for inconsistency measures in Section 3 are mostly independent of the actual approach for knowledge representation and can also be used for other approaches as long as notions of satisfaction and inconsistency are well-defined.
The focus of the discussion in this paper was mainly on properties of inconsistency measures and not on their algorithmic computation and complexity. However, Equation (6) already induces a straightforward method to compute the value I D (K) for a specific knowledge base K by representing (6) as an optimization problem, see (Thimm, 2009; Muiño, 2011) for formalizations. Note that these optimization problems are, in general, non-convex. Furthermore, a subproblem of determining the inconsistency value for a knowledge base K is checking consistency of probabilistic conditional knowledge bases which is an NP-hard problem (Paris, 2006) . Therefore, determining I D (K) is in general a hard task and future work comprises of investigating scalable approaches. Some first steps have already been conducted in (Thimm, 2011b) by approximating I D (K) by "similar" convex optimization problems. Future work comprises of developing optimized algorithms by utilizing e. g. more sophisticated methods for probabilistic consistency checking (Finger and Bona, 2011) . The basic approach for computing I D (K) using non-convex optimization methods has also been implemented in the Tweety library for artificial intelligence Proof. Assume that c is not free in K ∪ {c}. Then there is a set M ∈ MI(K) with c ∈ M. As M \ {c} is consistent and At(M \ {c}) ∩ At({c}) = ∅ (as c is safe in K) let P 1 be a probability function in F(At\At({c})) with P 1 |= pr M\{c}. As c is normal let P 2 be a probability function in F(At({c})) with P 2 |= pr c. Let ω ∈ Ω(At) and define ω A with A ⊆ At to be the projection of ω on A, i. e. ω A = {a | a ∈ A, ω |= a} ∪ {¬a | a ∈ A, ω |= ¬a}. Define a probability function P in F(At) via
for all ω ∈ Ω(At). Note that f : Ω(At) → Ω(At \ At({c})) × Ω(At({c})) with
is a bijection. It follows that P is indeed a probability function as
Furthermore, for ω ∈ Ω(At \ At({c})) it holds that
and similarly P (ω ) = P 2 (ω ). It follows that P |= pr M \ {c} and P |= pr c contradicting the assumption that M is a minimal inconsistent subset.
4. Let M ∈ MI(K) be a minimal inconsistent subset of K. Then it holds that M ⊆ K ⊆ K .
Suppose M / ∈ MI(K ) which is equivalent to stating that either M is not minimal or not inconsistent. Both cases contradict the assumption M ∈ MI(K). 5. Let K = M∈MI(K) M. It holds that I(K) = I(K ) due to the facts that K \ K only contains free conditionals of K and that I satisfies independence. As the same is true for K it follows I(K) = I(K ). 6. Let K = M∈MI(K) M. It holds that I(K) = I(K ) due to the facts that K \ K only contains free conditionals of K and that I satisfies independence. As K K due to MI(K) MI(K ) and K \ K contains at least one conditional c that is not free in Kotherwise it would be MI(K) = MI(K )-it follows I(K ) > I(K ) = I(K) as I satisfies penalty.
Proof. Observe that the set of models Mod({c}) of a probabilistic conditional c = (
That is, Mod({c}) is the intersection of F(At) with a hyperplane, i. e. a linear space of dimension 2 |At| − 1 (note that F(At) can be embedded in a space of dimension 2 |At| , one dimension for each probability of an interpretation), see also (Paris, 2006) . In general, there are three different possible relationships between any two hyperplanes in a space of dimension 2 |At| : they may either be parallel, intersect in a linear space of dimension 2 |At| − 2, or coincide. For example, two planes in 3-dimensional space are either parallel, intersect in a line, or are the same. Then c 1 |= pr c 2 implies that the hyperplanes corresponding to c 1 and c 2 coincide, otherwise there would be a model of c 1 that is not a model of c 2 . It follows Mod({c 1 }) = Mod({c 2 }) and the claim.
Proof. We only show that I 0 satisfies consistency, irrelevance of syntax, monotonicity, independence, and normalization as weak independence follows from independence due to Proposition 3.
Consistency A knowledge base K is consistent if and only if I 0 (K) = 0 by definition.
Irrelevance of Syntax
If K is consistent then I 0 (K ∪ {c}) ≥ I 0 (K) = 0 by definition.
Independence Assume that K is consistent and c is free in K ∪ {c}. If K ∪ {c} would be inconsistent then for every minimal inconsistent subset M of K ∪{c} it holds that c / ∈ M. Hence, M is also a minimal inconsistent subset of K rendering K inconsistent. As K is consistent it follows that K ∪ {c} is consistent and therefore I 0 (K ∪ {c}) = 0 = I 0 (K). If K is inconsistent so is any superset of K and hence I 0 (K ∪ {c}) = 1 = I 0 (K).
Normalization For every K it holds that either I 0 (K) = 0 or I 0 (K) = 1 and therefore
Proof. We only show that I MI satisfies consistency, super-additivity, irrelevance of syntax, MIseparability, and penalty, as monotonicity follows from super-additivity, weak independence follows from independence, and independence follows from MI-separability, cf. Proposition 3.
Consistency If K is consistent it follows that MI(K) = ∅ and therefore
Super-additivity Let K ∩K = ∅. Due to Proposition 3 it holds that MI(K) ⊆ MI(K ∪K ) and
Irrelevance of syntax Let K 1 and K 2 be knowledge bases with
for every c ∈ K 1 and due to the fact that ρ K 1 ,K 2 is a bijection it follows that M is a minimal inconsistent subset of
MI-separability Let K 1 , K 2 be knowledge bases with MI(
Penalty Let c / ∈ K be a conditional that is not free in K ∪ {c}. By the facts that MI(K) ⊆ MI(K ∪ {c}) and that there is a M ∈ MI(K ∪ {c}) with c ∈ M it follows that |MI(K)| < |MI(K ∪ {c})| and therefore I MI (K) < I MI (K ∪ {c}).
Proof. We only show that I C MI satisfies consistency, super-additivity, irrelevance of syntax, MIseparability, and penalty as monotonicity follows from super-additivity, weak independence follows from independence, and independence follows from MI-separability, cf. Proposition 3.
Consistency If K is consistent it follows that MI(K) = ∅ and therefore I C MI (K) = 0 (the empty sum). If K is inconsistent then MI(K) = ∅ with M ∈ MI(K) and |M| > 0. It follows that I
Irrelevance of syntax Let K 1 and K 2 be knowledge bases with K 1 ≡ s K 2 and let ρ K 1 ,K 2 : K 1 → K 2 be a bijection with c ≡ e ρ K 1 ,K 2 (c) for all c ∈ K 1 . In the proof of Proposition 6 it has already been shown that M is a minimal inconsistent subset of K 1 if and only
Penalty Let c / ∈ K be a conditional that is not free in K ∪ {c}. By the facts that MI(K) ⊆ MI(K ∪ {c}) and that there is a M ∈ MI(K ∪ {c}) with c ∈ M it follows that |MI(K)| < |MI(K ∪ {c})| and therefore
Proof. Let K = c 1 , . . . , c n and let K 1 , . . . , K n be defined via K i = K \ {c i } for i = 1, . . . , n. Each K i for i = 1, . . . , n is consistent as K is minimally inconsistent. Therefore, let P 1 , . . . , P n be probability functions with P i |= pr K i for i = 1, . . . , n. DefineP throughP (P i ) = 1 /n and P (P ) = 0 for all P ∈ F(At) with P / ∈ {P 1 , . . . , P n }. Note that every c i is contained in every K j with j = i. Therefore, all probability functions P j with j = i satisfy c i and it followŝ
It follows thatP (c i ) = 1 − 1 /n for every i = 1, . . . , n and, hence, I η (K) ≥ (1 − 1 /n). It is also easy to see that there can be noP withP (c i ) > 1 − 1 /n for all i = 1, . . . , n, see (Knight, 2002) for details. It follows I η (K) = (1 − 1 /n).
Proof. We only show that I η satisfies consistency, monotonicity, independence, irrelevance of syntax and normalization as weak independence follows from independence, cf. Proposition 3.
Consistency Let K be consistent and P be a probability function with P |= pr K. Definê P P viaP P (P ) = 1 andP P (P ) = 0 for all P ∈ F(At) with P = P . It follows that P P (c) = 1 for every c ∈ K and due to normalization it follows I η (K) = 1 − 1 = 0. If K is inconsistent there can be noP withP (c) = 1 for every c ∈ K because otherwise every P withP (P ) > 0 would obey P |= pr K. Therefore max{η | ∃P : ∀c ∈ K :P (c) ≥ η} < 1 and I η (K) > 0.
Monotonicity Let K be a knowledge base, c a conditional and K = K ∪ {c}. LetP ∈ F 2 (At) be a probability function and η ∈ [0, 1] be such that
In particular, it holds thatP (c) ≥ η for all c ∈ K and therefore
Independence Let K be a knowledge base and let c ∈ K be free in K. Due to monotonicity it follows
is analogous to the proof of Corollary 2.20 in (Knight, 2002) .
Irrelevance of Syntax Let K 1 and K 2 be knowledge bases with K 1 ≡ s K 2 and let ρ K 1 ,K 2 : 
Proof. Let K = c 1 , . . . , c n be a knowledge base with
In particular, it holds that lim i→∞ P i = Q with Q ∈ F(At).
2 For j = 1, . . . , n, if Q(φ j ) > 0 then there is some k ∈ N such that for all i > k it holds that P i (φ j ) > 0 as well. Therefore, for i > k it holds that P i (ψ j | φ j ) = x i j and
. . , y n ) and therefore Q ∈ P K , i. e., P K is closed. Consider now the projection ρ :
. . , x n for P, x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ P K . As F(At) is compact-see e. g. (Thimm, 2011b)-it follows that ρ is a closed map, cf. the Tube Lemma 3 (Munkres, 1999) . Therefore, ρ maps closed sets to closed sets and it follows that
is a closed set. Observe that we can write I D (K) as
As ρ(P K ) is a closed set-and also compact as it is bounded due to ρ(P K ) ⊆ [0, 1] n -and the mapping x 1 , . . . , x n → d( p 1 , . . . , p n , x 1 , . . . , x n ) is continuous-as d is a continuous function and p 1 , . . . , p n are constants-the set
is closed as well. Note that ρ(P K ) and therefore N d K are non-empty as for every K there is always a x such that K[ x] is consistent (take an arbitrary positive probability function P and define
2 Note that the set F(At) is a closed set, see e. g. (Thimm, 2011b) . 3 An equivalent formalization of the Tube Lemma is "If X is Hausdorff and Y is Hausdorff and compact then p : X × Y → X with p(x, y) = x is a closed map". Note, that all spaces above are Hausdorff as they are subsets of Euclidean spaces (or can be characterized as such). Let now K = c 1 , . . . , c n and c i = (ψ i | φ i )[p i ] for i = 1, . . . , n be a knowledge base and let c = (ψ | φ)[p] be free in K ∪ {c}. Assume that K is also a minimal inconsistent set, i. e. MI(K) = {K}. Let I p (K) = x and let x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ [0, 1] n be such that Λ K (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is consistent and |p 1 − x 1 | + . . . + |p n − x n | = x. Consider now K = (ψ 1 | φ 1 )[p 1 ] , . . . , (ψ n | φ n )[p n ], (ψ | φ) [p] . It suffices to show that Λ K (x 1 , . . . , x n , p) is consistent. Define C j = K \ {(ψ j | φ j )[p j ]} for every j = 1, . . . , n. Then both C j and C j ∪ {c} are consistent. Let p j be such that there is a P with P |= pr C j ∪ {c}, P |= pr (ψ j | φ j )[p j ] and |p j − p j | is minimal. It follows that |p j − p j | ≥ x (otherwise this would contradict I p (K) = x). Assume w.l.o.g. p j > p j . As {c, c j } is consistent as well (as c is free) it follows that {c, (ψ j | φ j )[y]} is consistent for every y ∈ [p j , p j ] due to our elaboration above. As |p j − x j | ≤ x it follows x j ∈ [p j , p j ] as well (or x j ∈ [p j , p j ] if p j > p j ). Hence, {c, (ψ j | φ j )[x j ]} is consistent for every j = 1, . . . , n. As Λ K (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is consistent and c is consistent with every combination of conditionals in Λ K (x 1 , . . . , x n ) it follows that Λ K (x 1 , . . . , x n , p) is consistent. The above can be generalized if K contains multiple minimal inconsistent subsets by iteratively considering each minimal inconsistent subset of K. By Proposition 3 it also follows that I p satisfies weak independence. Irrelevance of syntax Let K 1 and K 2 be knowledge bases with K 1 ≡ s K 2 and let ρ K 1 ,K 2 : K 1 → K 2 be a bijection with c ≡ e ρ K 1 ,K 2 (c) for all c ∈ K 1 . Due to Mod({c}) = Mod({ρ K 1 ,K 2 (c)}) it follows that d E (P, Mod({c})) = d E (P, Mod({ρ K 1 ,K 2 (c)})) and therefore C h K 1 (P ) = C h K 2 (P ) for every c ∈ K 1 and P ∈ F(At). It follows I It suffices to show that there is a P * ∈Ω At(K) h (K \ {c n }) with P |= pr c n as this implies C Let ω ∈ Ω(At) and define ω A ∈ Ω(A) with A ⊆ At to be the projection of ω onto A, e. g. for At = {a, b, c} and ω = a ∧ ¬b ∧ c it is ω {a,b} = a ∧ ¬b. Furthermore, if P ∈ F(At) let P | A ∈ F(At) denote the projection of P onto A ⊆ At, that is P | A (ω ) = ω∈Ω(At),ω|=ω P (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω(A). In (Daniel, 2009 ) it has been shown that C h K is language invariant, that is in particular, for every P ∈ F(At \ At(c n )) and every P ∈ F(At) such that P = P | At\At(cn) it holds that C h K\{cn} (P ) = C h K\{cn} (P ). In other words, as no atom of At(c n ) is mentioned in K \ {c n } it holds that C h K\{cn} (P ) is the same as C h K\{cn} (P ) if P is the projection of P onto At \ At(c n ). In particular, it followŝ Ω At(K) h (K \ {c n }) = {P | P | At(K)\At(cn) ∈Ω At(K)\At(cn) h (K \ {c n })} Let now P ∈ F(At(c n )) with P |= pr c n and P ∈Ω At(K)\At(cn) h (K \ {c n }). Define P ∈ F(At(K)) via P (ω) = P (ω At(cn) )P (ω At(K)\At(cn) )
By construction it holds that P | At(K)\At(cn) = P ∈Ω At(K)\At(cn) h (K \ {c n }) and therefore P ∈Ω At(K) h (K \ {c n }). As P |= pr c n the claim follows.
